negative domestic ramifications and electoral punishment by casualty-averse constituencies (Mello 2014, 75) . Considering these costs and risks, the meekness of most members of the anti-IS coalition might not be surprising. Nevertheless, several states did carry out air strikes, indicating that these costs were not necessarily insurmountable.
This article aims to explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes against the IS. It builds on the rich scholarly literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop a multicausal model, which is tested with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The results of the analysis suggest that the threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the United States constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia's immediate vicinity refrained from participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the United States' security guarantee. In contrast, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had an impact on participation in the air strikes.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive research on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an integrated model for explaining participation in the air strikes against the IS. The second section justifies the case selection, introduces QCA as an appropriate method to test the model, and discusses the measurement of the variables. The third section presents the results of the analysis, which are interpreted against the backdrop of the theoretical model in the fourth section. Lastly, the study's major findings are recapitulated in the conclusions.
Theoretical Framework
The pattern of participation in the air strikes against the IS presents a puzzle for two of the major theories of multilateral military operations and armed conflict: collective action theory and democratic peace theory. Collective action theory has dominated research on military burden-sharing ever since the seminal article of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) , which characterized defense as a pure public good, implying that noncontributors cannot be excluded from enjoying its benefits. In consequence, states have few incentives to contribute if a state with the formidable military might of the United States is willing to unilaterally launch an operation. The disproportionately large contribution of the United States to the combat operations against the IS corresponds to expectations of the pure public goods model. However, the latter cannot explain why several other states contributed to the strike operations instead of taking a free ride off the United States.
Research on democratic peace examines the link between democracy and armed conflict. Democratic peace theory contends that there is "something in the internal make up of democratic states" that makes them less warlike than semidemocracies and autocracies (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626) . Although some studies have examined whether democracies have less frequent domestic armed conflicts, the brunt of democratic peace research focusses on the interstate democratic peace (Hegre 2014, 624) . This research almost consistently confirms that democracies rarely fight each other, but there is less compelling evidence that democracies are in general more peaceful. Since the vast majority of the anti-IS coalition are full-fledged democracies, the general hesitancy to participate in the air strikes suggests that democracies are indeed reluctant to deploy military means. However, the fact that several democracies did carry out air strikes suggests considerable variation among established democracies in their propensity to get involved in armed conflict.
This study builds on more recent strands of the literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace to explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes. After several authors convincingly argued that the public goods model does not fully account for burden sharing decisions, more general joint product and integrated multicausal models were introduced to the study of burden sharing (see, e.g., Sandler 1977; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994; Shimizu and Sandler 2010) . The former assumes that military operations produce multiple benefits, varying from purely public to country-specific and private benefits, the latter that contributions to multilateral operations are caused by a complex interaction between international and domestic-level variables. Insights from this line of research are complemented with insights from a recent direction in democratic peace research, which seeks to explain the varying conflict involvement of established democracies (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Chan and Safran 2006; Schuster and Maier 2006) .
Balance of Threats
Integrated models generally invoke the "balance-of-threats hypothesis" to explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g., Bennett et al. 1994, 42-44; Auerswald 2004, 639; Davidson 2011, 174) . This hypothesis builds on Stephen Walt's (1987) neo-realist theory of alliance formation, which contends that states enter alliances to balance against threats. In the context of military operations, the hypothesis expects states to contribute to operations that counter threats to their national interest. The benefits of balancing against threats are only gained by states to which the target of the intervention actually poses a threat. Such country-specific benefits are taken into account in an alternative to the pure public goods model: the joint products model (Sandler and Shimizu 2014, 46) . This assumes that military operations produce multiple goods, ranging from purely public to country-specific and private benefits. If an operation mainly produces country-specific joint products, contributions are expected to match the operation's benefits. In line with the balance-of-threats hypothesis, the joint products model would thus expect states that faced the highest level of threat to participate in an operation.
The main threat posed by the rise of the IS is the increased risk of terrorist attacks. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other recent targets of US-led interventions, IS-controlled territory risks becoming a safe haven and training ground for international jihadists (Choi and James 2014, 6-9) . Countries that have been hit hard by Islamic terrorist attacks in the past can be expected to be most responsive to this increased terrorist threat (Sandler and Shimizu 2014, 50) . Additionally, a state's concern with the rise of the IS might be connected to the number of nationals that have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. Governments and intelligence officials have expressed concerns that these volunteers might return home and use their combat experience and battle training to carry out attacks in their home countries (Bakker, Paulussen, and Entenman 2013, 4) . Although it has been argued that "the threat presented by foreign fighters has been exaggerated," research on the subject suggests that returning militants pose a risk to their home countries (Byman and Shapiro 2014) . Nearly 30% of the individuals involved in the twenty-six terrorist plots investigated by de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014, 64) had been abroad for fighting or training. According to Hegghammer (2013, 11) , over a quarter of all individuals involved in terrorist plots in the West are known to have experience as foreign fighters, and 46% of all plots include at least one such veteran. Moreover, his data indicates that the presence of foreign fighters in a terrorist plot increases the probability that it will actually come to execution, as well as the probability that people will get killed in the attack.
Since the number of western foreign fighters active in Syria is unprecedented in modern history, the threat to their home countries should not be underestimated (Lister 2014, 88) . Recognizing this threat, however, does not automatically imply it constitutes an incentive to participate in the air strikes. In fact, the strike operations are likely to increase the probability that returning IS fighters attempt to carry out attacks in retaliation (Lister 2014, 97) . However, countries with a large number of foreign fighters are likely to perceive the costs of inaction as higher. Not only did they experience the problem first hand and, thereby, have undeniable evidence that their country is fertile recruiting ground for IS fighters, returning militants also play an active role in radicalizing new jihadists (Hegghammer 2013, 12) . In consequence, states with a large number of militants active in Syria have the greatest incentive to avoid the IS consolidating its territory, attracting more foreign fighters, and, thereby, becoming an even greater threat to national security.
Alliance Politics
Alliance politics are a second plausible explanatory variable for the pattern of participation in the air strikes (e.g., Bennett et al. 1994, 72; Baltrusaitis 2010, 205) . Integrated models generally build on Glenn Snyder's secondary "Alliance Security Dilemma" (1984) to formulate expectations on the link between alliance politics and contributions to multilateral operations. This postulates that members of military alliances face two countervailing pressures: fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. The former involves the risk of being deserted by an ally, the latter of being entangled in a conflict central to the ally's interests but peripheral to one's own. A country's choices in the alliance security dilemma are primarily determined by its relative dependence on the ally. The more a state depends on the ally for assistance against future security threats, the more likely the costs of abandonment will outweigh the costs of entrapment (Walt 1987, 471-472) .
More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not constitute the only reason for states to provide support to an ally. Davidson (2011, 15) prefers the term "alliance value" over "alliance dependence" because states "may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does not necessarily entail dependence." More specifically, he argues that alliance value also depends on the expected influence on an ally, which determines whether they will be "able to leverage their ally's power into outcomes in their favor." Ringsmose (2010, 330-331) agrees with this line of reasoning by arguing that there are two groups of NATO allies with a strong interest in a good relationship with the United States: "Article 5ers" and "Traditional Atlanticists." The first group comprises the states that focus on NATO's collective defense principle, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In line with the alliance dependence hypothesis, it comprises states that perceive a resurging Russian threat and "realize their security comes in the shape of American security guarantees" (Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Ringsmose 2010, 331) . Atlanticists, in turn, are allies who perceive themselves as states with a special relationship with Washington, which they consider "an important key to their security and their political clout on the international scene" (Ringsmose 2010, 331) .
States might thus value their alliance with the United States because they are dependent on the United States' security guarantee or perceive a special relationship with Washington. While "Article 5ers" perceive contributions to NATO or US-led operations as "a fee to obtain American protection," "Atlanticists" considerer it "the price of political influence" (Ringsmose 2010, 332) . Either way, alliance politics constitutes a plausible explanation for why states participated in the air strikes instead of taking a free ride off the United States' military might. As argued by Ringsmose (2010, 325) , security alliances produce excludable benefits: the US can "resort to the intra-alliance threats (. . .), generating fear of abandonment and marginalization among the smaller powers." Even if an operation mainly produces purely public benefits, states might still decide to participate if its leading policymakers believe that other benefits produced by their alliance with the United States would otherwise be withheld (Ringsmose 2010, 330-331) .
Domestic Constraints
Studies building on integrated models suggest that international-level variables like threats and alliance politics "fare pretty well in explaining political leaders' incentives to contribute" (Oma 2012, 565) . However, they consistently conclude that domestic-level conditions need to be incorporated to fully account for a political leader's ability to participate. Democratic peace research is highly informative on which domestic-level determinants can be expected to matter. A more recent direction in this line of research emphasizes the significant variation across democratic political systems, which, in turn, is expected to affect their propensity to resort to the use of force (e.g., Prins and Sprecher 1999) . Several scholars have argued that executives should be more constrained in parliamentary than in presidential systems, while coalition governments should be more constrained than single-party governments. However, quantitative studies generally did not confirm these conjectures (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 824; Leblang and Chan 2003) .
Several scholars did find evidence for the impact of another institutional variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in decision making on the use of force. Democratic parliaments are expected to open up governmental decision making to public scrutiny, forcing "governments to give reasons for political decisions" (Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2008, 4) . In consequence, strong parliamentary veto powers should significantly restrict a government's freedom of military action. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) describe how the Turkish Grand National Assembly overturned its government's decision to permit using Turkey as a base for the US intervention in the 2003 Iraq war. Similarly, Reiter and Tillman (2002, 824) conclude that "greater legislative controls over foreign policy such as legislative power to ratify treaties is is associated with lower propensity to initiate disputes," while Choi (2010, 438) shows that legislative constraints "are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force."
Recent work on "parliamentary war powers" has examined the differences "among democracies in their respective institutional arrangements regarding parliamentary participation in foreign military and security policy" (Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2010, 4) . Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2010, 9-13 ) distinguish four power resources of parliaments regarding security policy making: legislative, control, communication, and dismissal resources. In a study of European involvement in the 2003 Iraq intervention, they find a strong association between high parliamentary war powers and weak degrees of war involvement (Dieterich et al. 2010, 71) . Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010, 18) focus on one aspect of parliamentary control: "can parliament veto a deployment that is being planned by the executive?" Although they recognize that such an ex-ante veto is not the only resource through which parliaments can exert control, Wagner et al. (2010, 19) rightfully contend that no other instrument is likely to be as effective.
Partisan politics constitute a second source of cross-democratic variation. Since political parties are an essential part of the domestic politics of mature democracies, political partisanship can be expected to impact their foreign and security policy (Mello 2014, 37) . In a comprehensive study on the creation of a European security institution outside NATO, Hofmann (2013, 204) demonstrates that ideological orientations structure government preferences in security policy. Studies that scrutinize the link between government ideology and military intervention also conclude that political partisanship matters for military deployment decisions. Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) assume that political leaders, above all, want to remain in office. Since the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than the electoral platforms of left-leaning parties, the former are expected to be more inclined to support the use of force. Their results, as well as the successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009) , confirm this inference. Similarly, the study of Koch and Sullivan (2010) suggests that leaders whose base of support is on the left of the political spectrum are more constrained by the costs of war fighting. Stevens (2014, 12) demonstrates that the potential audience costs of war are greater for left-wing than for right-wing governments, and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war. States governed by a right-leaning executive can thus be expected to be more likely to participate in the air strikes against the IS.
Several recent studies suggest that partisan politics and parliamentary veto power should be analyzed in conjunction, rather than independently. Williams (2014, 120) , for example, argues that opposition parties are more likely to challenge ideologically dissimilar governments, while Choi (2010, 441) contends that the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012, 427) integrates hypotheses on partisan politics and institutional structures in a sophisticated multicausal model, which only expects the combination of parliamentary veto power with a left parliament to create an effective veto point against military deployment. In contrast, the study of Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) on Turkey's involvement in the 2003 Iraq war shows that parliaments can constitute an effective veto point even if a single-party government enjoys a parliamentary majority. This finding resonates with the research of Auerswald (1999, 475-480) , who argues that executives will be reluctant to use force if the decision can be hindered or overturned by the legislature, irrespective of "the convergence or divergence of executive-legislative preferences."
Integrated Model
The pattern of participation in the air campaign is expected to result from a complex interplay between the international and domestic variables discussed in the previous section. States are expected to have an incentive to participate when they consider the rise of the IS a significant threat to their national interest or highly value their relationship with the United States. These incentives will, however, only lead to actual contributions if combined with a right-leaning executive that does not face a left parliament with a veto on military deployment. Figure 1 summarizes these expectations in an integrated model.
Although the model integrates hypotheses from the prevailing theories on military intervention, it does not incorporate every possible explanatory variable. Most importantly, public opinion is not included in the model. Unfortunately, reliable public opinion data are only available for eleven cases. Including public opinion would require reducing the sample of cases by two-thirds, significantly impeding the generalizability of the study's results. An empirical test of an alternative model that incorporates public opinion was conducted on the reduced sample (cf. Appendix 1). This demonstrates that public opinion was not decisive for participation in Operation Inherent Resolve. 
Research Design
This section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach, and discusses the measurement of the variables.
Case Selection
The analysis is confined to a specific category of cases: the democratic members of the anti-IS coalition. As argued extensively in the democratic peace literature, "democratic and non-democratic regimes behave differently in their foreign policy" (Leblang and Chan 2003, 385) . In consequence, only democracies are expected to share enough background characteristics to be comparable along the variables specified in the previous section (Berg-Schlosser and de Meur 2009, 20) . Furthermore, the expectations on domestic constraints only apply to democracies. In line with previous research, states that score 8 or higher on the Polity IV autocracy-democracy scale are considered democracies, resulting in forty-three democratic members of the anti-IS coalition, which are presented in Table 1 (Mello 2014, 7) .
In line with the possibility principle, only cases where the outcome "participation in the air strikes" is possible are included in the analysis (Mahoney and Goertz 2004) . Fourteen democracies did not have fighter jets equipped to attack ground targets. In consequence, these were excluded as possible contributors. Additionally, Taiwan is excluded from the analysis because comparative data on partisan politics is missing. After excluding these states, twenty-eight potential democratic participants remain, all of which have combat-capable aircraft and many of which participated in recent strike operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and/or Libya. Strikingly, however, only eight of them carried out air strikes against the IS. Ten months after the first US bombs struck IS targets, none of the remaining eighteen democratic members has announced that it will participate in offensive air operations.
Methodological Approach: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of participation in the air strikes is tested with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an analytical technique that allows for a systematic comparison of a large number of cases on three to eight causal conditions. QCA is an adequate methodological choice if "there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon to be explained is the result of a specific kind of causal complexity," generally described as "multiple conjunctural causation" (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 77) . Multiple causation implies there are multiple paths toward an outcome; conjunctural causation that these paths consist of combinations of conditions. In line with the notion of multiple causation, the model comprises several pathways toward participation; in line with conjunctural causation, these consist of combinations of international and domestic conditions. This research builds on the multivalue version of QCA (mvQCA). Although many methodologists initially took a sceptical stance on this QCA-variant, recent assessments have shown that mvQCA is a valuable technique for comparative analysis (Haesebrouck 2013; Thiem 2014) . The choice for QCA's multivalue variant is informed by the nature of the conditions and the outcome. The latter presents itself in a dichotomous form and, therefore, cannot easily be integrated into the fuzzy set variant of QCA (Rihoux et al. 2009, 169, Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 277) . The original crisp set version of QCA, in turn, only allows dichotomous variables, which would entail a significant loss of information for the condition "Threat." Since mvQCA allows combining multichotomous conditions with a dichotomous outcome, it is the most suited QCA variant for this study.
Measurement and Dichotomization
The coding of the outcome depends on whether a country participated in the air strikes. Countries that had participated in the air strikes by the end of 2014 are assigned a score of 1 on the outcome, the other cases a score of 0 (cf. Table 1) . With the important exception of the United States' disproportionately large contribution, there are no decisive differences in the degree of participation among the democracies that carried out air strikes. All participating democratic allies of the United States started deploying in autumn 2014 and initially restricted strike operations to Iraq. Canada is the only democracy that expanded its operations to Syria, but only decided to do so in April 2015 (Zenko 2015) . Its contribution of six CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, which had flown 673 sorties by June 2015, is similar to the contribution of the other democracies (Canadian Armed Forces 2015) . Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands deployed between six and eight F-16s each, which, respectively, had flown around 600, 375, and 600 sorties by The condition "Threat" was divided into three categories, respectively corresponding to a high (2), intermediate (1), and low (0) levels of threats. Countries that suffered a high number of casualties in recent terrorist acts committed by individuals tied to jihadist terrorist groups or with at least 150 foreign fighters are coded 2. Hereby, all countries with a high number of foreign fighters, either absolute or relative to their populations, are comprised in the category that corresponds to high threat. A score of 0 was assigned to cases that had no foreign fighters or high-casualty terrorist attacks. An intermediate category 1 was created for the cases with more than 50 but fewer than 150 reported foreign fighters. Estimates of each country's foreign fighters and casualties suffered in terrorist acts committed by jihadist terrorist groups between 1993 and 2013 are listed in Table 2 . Two conditions are included that reflect expectations on alliance politics: "Alliance Dependence" and "Alliance Value." The former comprises the states that are dependent on the United States' security guarantee, the latter the states that perceive a special relationship with Washington. The coding of both conditions builds on scholarly literature, which is very consistent on which states show a strong interest in a good relationship with the United States (cf. Howorth 2007, 146-160; Graeger and Haugevik 2009; Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013) . Since some of the consulted studies use a state's propensity to commit forces to US-led operations as an indicator of its value for its alliance with the United States, coding conditions on the basis of these studies might seem to result in tautological reasoning. However, the consulted research generally bases a state's relationship with the United States on a wider set of indicators, like historical ties with the United States, the explicit identification of a special relationship with Washington, geographical location, or a preference for NATO over alternative security institutions.
The East European countries were assigned a score of 1 on "Alliance Dependence" since they perceive a resurging Russian threat and are dependent on NATO's collective defense provision to balance it (Menon and Lipkin 2003; Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Ringsmose 2010) . Similarly, Japan and South Korea are dependent on support of the United States in their long-standing conflicts with, respectively, China and North Korea (Baltrusaitis 2010, 39-89; ChanlettAvery 2011; Santoro and Warden 2015) . States that are not particularly dependent on the United States' security guarantee but nevertheless perceive themselves as strong Atlanticists are coded 1 on "Alliance Value." This category comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Howorth 2007, 146-160; Graeger and Haugevik 2009; Biehl et al. 2013; Bisley 2013, 403; Dobell 2014, 395; Massie 2014) . In line with Ringsmose (2010) , Norway was assigned a score of 1 on both conditions. Because it shares a border with Russia, Norway is particularly dependent on the support of the United States for its national security. However, it also considers its strong relationship with the United States a way "to be heard in the international arena" (Graeger 2005, 90; Graeger and Haugevik 2009, 20) .
Since an ex-ante veto is generally considered the strongest form of parliamentary involvement in decisions on the use of force, countries where parliament either has a legal or a de facto veto were assigned a score of 1 (H€ anggi 2004, 14; Mello 2012, 432) . Information on parliamentary veto powers was retrieved from the parlcon data set (Wagner et al. 2010) . Since this only assigns parliamentary war powers up till 2004 and does not include South Korea, this information was crosschecked and supplemented with more recent sources (i.e., Born, Fuior, and Lazzarini 2008; Konishi and Manyin 2009; Dieterich et al. 2010; Biehl et al. 2013) .
The level of parliamentary involvement differs significantly among the cases, ranging from a legal obligation of prior parliamentary consent for all military deployments to the absence of parliamentary involvement in actual decision making. Three categories are situated between these two extremes. First, operations conducted under formal organizations are exempt from prior parliamentary approval in some of the cases. Since the air strikes against the IS were conducted by a coalition of the willing, no such exception applied to the operation. In consequence, these countries were assigned a score of 1. Second, seeking parliamentary approval is not a legal norm but constitutes an unwritten rule in the Netherlands, Norway, and, since the government's defeat over military action in Syria in August 2013, the United Kingdom. Because their governments could not reasonably be expected to participate in the air strikes without parliamentary consent, these countries are assigned a score of 1. A third category consists of states with ambiguous legislation, but where parliamentary veto powers are generally considered relatively weak. In consequence, these countries were coded 0. Table 3 summarizes parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions. The coding of the ideological orientation of the cases' executive and parliament draws on the Right-Left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project, which is based on quantitative content analyses of election programs (Volkens et al. 2015) . In line with previous studies (Palmer et al. 2004; Mello 2012, 436-437) , party positions (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party's ideological position (i) on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation: 
Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by summing up each party's (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). Executives and parliaments with a positive score were coded 1 since a score above 0 corresponds to parties that make more right than left statements in their manifestos. Table 4 summarizes the aggregated RILE scores.
Analysis and Results
The mvQCA-procedure proceeds in two steps.
3 First, the data is synthesized in a truth table, which contains a row for every possible combination of conditions. Each case is attributed to the row that corresponds to its specific combination; rows without empirical cases are considered logical remainders. The truth table is presented in Table 5 .
Subsequently, Boolean algebra is used to minimize the truth table. Depending on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. If all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated, minimization results in the parsimonious solution; if only the remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated, it results in the intermediate formula. 4 In line with the suggestion of Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 279) , most recent QCA applications focus on the latter solution. However, Baumgartner (2014, 840) has convincingly demonstrated that intermediate solution formulas cannot be causally interpreted and argues that resource must be made to the parsimonious formula if QCA is applied to test causal hypotheses (Baumgartner 2014, 854) . Unfortunately, the parsimonious formula is not without flaws since it forces researchers to introduce untenable simplifying assumptions.
This study presents both the parsimonious and intermediate solution.
The former includes the conditions that distinguish combinations that are consistently linked to the outcome from those that are not. In line with Ragin and Fiss (2008, 204) , the terms of the parsimonious formula are considered the "core" causal conditions. The conditions that are added in the intermediate solution are present in the cases that display the outcome and can only be removed by making assumptions about logical remainders that are at odds with theoretical expectations. In line with Ragin and Fiss (2008, 204) , these are considered "complementary" or "contributing" conditions. Tables 6 and 7 present the intermediate and parsimonious solutions for, respectively, the presence and the absence of the outcome.
5 Two descriptive measures are used to evaluate both solution types: consistency and coverage. 6 The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms that the solution consistently produces the outcome and approaches unity as the data provides stronger evidence. Coverage describes the relevance of the formulas and approaches unity as a causal path becomes more relevant.
The parsimonious solution of the outcome's presence shows that the combination of a high "Threat" with either the absence of "Parliamentary Veto" or the presence of "Alliance Value" constitutes a core causal path toward participation. The intermediate solution indicates that these are not linked to contributing conditions. The third and fourth causal paths of the parsimonious solution show that the combination of "Alliance Value" and an intermediate "Threat" with either the absence of "Parliamentary Veto" or the absence of "Alliance Dependence" also constitutes a core causal path. Both are linked to two contributing conditions: "Right Executive" and "Right Parliament."
The analysis of the outcome's absence demonstrates that four core causal paths consistently lead to nonparticipation. The first core causal path constitutes "Alliance Dependence," which is linked to two contributing conditions: "Parliamentary Veto" and absence of "Right Parliament." The second core causal path, the absence of "Threat," is linked to three (combinations of) contributing conditions: absence of "Alliance Dependence" and the combination of absence of "Alliance Value" with either "Right Executive" absent or "Parliamentary Veto" present. The third core causal path combines the absence of "Alliance Value" with" Parliamentary Veto." The intermediate solution indicates that it is linked to two sets of contributing conditions: the absence of "Threat" and the combination of absence of "Alliance Dependence" with absence of "Right Parliament." The combination of absence of "Alliance Value" with intermediate "Threat" constitutes the fourth core casual path, which is linked to one contributing condition: absence of "Alliance Dependence." 4 If no remainders are incorporated, this results in the "complex solution." The latter is presented in Appendix 2.
5
The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution. The presence of a high or intermediate "Threat," "Alliance Value," "Alliance Dependence," "Right Parliament," and "Right Executive" were linked to participation, as was the absence of "Parliamentary Veto." 6 Consistency and coverage are, respectively, calculated with the formula P minðXi; YiÞ= P ðXiÞ and P minðXi; YiÞ= P ðYiÞ, in which X denotes the membership scores in the causal combination and Y the scores in the outcome (Haesebrouck 2015) .
Interpretation
Arriving at intermediate and parsimonious formulas is not the ultimate goal of QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 280) . Instead, solutions must be related back to the cases and theoretical expectations (Rihoux and de Meur 2009, 65) . The results of the QCA confirm that alliance politics, threats, and parliamentary (Notes. AD, alliance dependence; AV, alliance value; PV, parliamentary veto; RE, right executive; RP, right parliament; TH, threat. Multiplication "*" refers to conjunction of conditions).
veto power are vital determinants for participation in the air strikes. In contrast, the results do not decisively demonstrate a link between partisan politics and participation in the air strikes. The pattern of participation in the air strikes against the IS does not convincingly confirm that executive or parliamentary ideology was decisive for participation in the air strikes. The parsimonious solutions of the outcome's presence and absence do not include a single condition on political partisanship, indicating that ideological differences were not necessary to distinguish participants from nonparticipants. The intermediate solutions do include conditions on ideology. In line with theoretical expectations, the absence of either "Right Executive" or "Right Parliament" are contributing conditions of the first three paths for the outcome's absence, while their presence is a contributing condition of the third and fourth core causal paths toward participation in the air strikes. The latter are the only combinations for participation that include an intermediate rather than a high level of threats, suggesting that right-leaning executives require fewer threats to resort to the use of force. However, since it was not included in the parsimonious formulas, the incorporation of "Right Executive" could be an artifact of the theoretical assumptions made for the production of the intermediate solution.
The lack of conclusive evidence that links partisan politics to participation might be related to the nature of the operation against the IS, which differs significantly from the cases that are generally included in studies that link military deployment to government ideology. The latter generally focus on militarized interstate disputes or, more recently, on the 2003 Iraq war. Unlike the 2003 Iraq war, the operation against IS does not constitute "a typical case for a conflict over which to expect partisan dispute" (Mello 2012, 426) . One of the reasons why the military operation was launched in August 2014 was the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq (Henderson 2014, 209) . 7 In a comprehensive study on the link between partisan politics and participation in peace enforcement operations, Rathbun (2004 Rathbun ( , 197, 2007 argues that leftist parties are actually more likely to support humanitarian interventions since they consider the promotion of the welfare of other countries part of their national interest. Right-leaning parties, on the other hand, have a more exclusive conception of their national interest and, therefore, only support operations if more narrow national interests are at stake. Since the operation against the IS pursued humanitarian goals and countered a threat to the participants' interests, both left-and right-leaning parties had reasons to support the operation. In consequence, the air strikes definitely do not constitute a most likely case for the hypotheses on partisan politics.
The results are less ambiguous with regards to the other domestic-level variable: parliamentary veto power. The absence of a legislative veto is a core causal condition of two paths toward the presence of the outcome, while its absence constitutes a core and/or contributing condition of several paths toward its absence. In line with the expectations of Auerswald (1999) and conclusions of Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) , the analyses show it is a relevant condition, irrespective of partisan politics. However, the first and last two core causal paths demonstrate that the prospect of legislative meddling did not inhibit participation if the combination of a strong threat and high alliance value provided states a strong incentive to participate.
The results clearly confirm the balance-of-threats hypothesis. Every causal path of the parsimonious solution for the outcome's presence includes either strong or intermediate threats, while the parsimonious solution for the outcome's absence shows that the absence of threats is sufficient for nonparticipation. A high threat generally implies a relatively large number of foreign fighters, which 7 In the course of July 2014, the IS had carried out horrific genocidal attacks on a range of Christian and Yazidi towns, forcing them to retreat to Mount Sinjar (Stansfield 2014 (Stansfield , 1337 .
suggests the latter constitutes a vital incentive for states to participate. This is remarkable since experts have warned that Western intervention is "a great recruiting sergeant" for Islamic extremists and the air strikes increased the probability of terrorist attacks by returning IS fighters (Byman and Shapiro 2014; Lister 2014, 97; Witney 2014) . Nevertheless, the pattern of participation is clearly linked to the number of foreign fighters.
Anecdotal evidence further confirms that foreign fighters were an important determinant for participation in the air strikes. An official at the Belgian ministry of foreign affairs, for example, suggested that the threat of returning foreign fighters was the single most important reason why Belgium participated in the air strikes.
8 Similarly, British Prime Minister Cameron has called the risk of British Islamist radicals returning from Syria and Iraq to attack Britain "the biggest national security threat," while Australian Prime Minister Abbott announced that Australia would contribute fighter jets to the US-led coalition shortly after the Australian police foiled a plot by Islamic State jihadists to conduct "demonstration killings" (Feast 2014; Winning 2014) . Conversely, when the Czech Republic announced it would not participate in the air strikes against the IS, its police president announced that the IS did not pose a threat to the Czech Republic and there was no information that anyone from its territory was participating in the activities of the Islamic State (Willoughby 2014) .
Finally, the results suggest remarkable inferences on the link between alliance politics and military deployment. "Alliance Value" was a causal ingredient of several paths toward participation, while "Alliance Dependence" was sufficient for nonparticipation. In line with theoretical expectations, perceiving a special relationship with Washington thus constituted an important incentive to participate. Strikingly, however, dependence on the United States' security guarantee actually inhibited contributions. This is especially surprising for the so-called "Article 5ers" (cf. supra). Because of Russia's interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the first half of 2014, the perceived threat for countries situated in Russia's vicinity was at a post-Cold War height at the time Washington was mobilizing allies to fight the IS (Allison 2014 (Allison , 1255 . In consequence, the "Article 5ers" should be most likely cases of the alliance dependence hypothesis. The latter expects greater tension with an adversary to increase a state's dependence on an ally, which, in turn, should increase a state's propensity to provide support to its partners (Snyder 1984, 472; Kupchan 1988, 330-333) .
A possible explanation for the nonparticipation of the "Article 5ers" is the waning commitment of the Central and Eastern European states to the transatlantic alliance. While these countries loyally supported the United States during the first two decades after the fall of communism, the close ties with the United States began to unravel after 2008 (Longhurst 2013; Mikulova and Simecka 2013) . The waning Atlanticism in the region was caused by the rebalancing of the United States' foreign policy priorities away from Europe and the attempt at the beginning of the first Obama administration to "reset" relations with Russia, which inflicted the fear that the United States would be less prone to take the Central and Eastern European countries' security concerns seriously (Longhurst 2013) . However, at the time when the United States was enlisting allies against the IS, Washington announced several measures to enhance the credibility of its security guarantees. Most importantly, the US launched the European Reassurance Initiative, which finances the stationing of military equipment and a rotating US presence in Eastern Europe (Lorenz 2014) . In consequence, countries situated in the region had few reasons to doubt the United States' commitment to their security when deciding on participation in the air strikes.
A second, more plausible, explanation for the lack of Eastern European contributions is that their fighter jets were not sufficiently equipped for the intervention. According to the World Air Forces 2015 Report, the air forces of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia are still comprised of outdated MiG 21s and MiG 29s (Flightglobal 2015) . Other Eastern European states did have the required military capacity to participate. Poland, for example, has a fleet of thirty-six F16s, while Hungary and the Czech Republic each have twelve Gripen-C aircraft (Bell and Hendrickson 2012) . In the run-up to the 2011 intervention in Libya, Poland and the Czech Republic claimed their pilots were insufficiently trained to participate, which could be the reason for not participating in the air strikes against the IS (Bell and Hendrickson 2012, 159; Chivviss 2014, 75) . However, Norway, the only non-Eastern European "Article 5er," clearly did not face such technical obstacles since its fighter jets accounted for a significant share of the air strikes during the air campaign in Libya (Chivviss 2014, 190) .
The most convincing explanation seems that the "Article 5ers" were not willing to dispatch fighter jets to a foreign theater amid increasing tensions with Russia. According to Neubauer et al. (2014) , this is the actual reason why Norway only provided nonlethal assistance to the international coalition against the IS. Likewise, Poland's Deputy Minister of Defence stressed that the RussianUkrainian conflict was its country's prime concern when he announced in February 2015 that Poland was still not willing to take part in combat operations against the IS (Radio Poland 2015). Instead of deploying their military assets to demonstrate their commitment to the United States, the "Article 5ers" chose to use them to balance Russian aggression. This does not contradict the alliance security dilemma; it only suggests there was no credible threat of abandonment. When introducing the alliance security dilemma, Snyder (1984, 474) actually argued that the risk of abandonment decreases if "the allies' interests that are in conflict with the adversary are shared." Russia's military interventions in Ukraine brought both the "Article 5ers" and the United States' interests clearly in conflict with Russia (Heisbourg 2015) . In consequence, the fear of abandonment was minimized and keeping their fighter jets at home to deter possible Russian aggression became the most rational option for the "Article 5ers."
Conclusions
Why did some democratic members of the anti-IS coalition participate in the air campaign, while others did not? This study built on integrated burden sharing models and democratic peace research to develop a multicausal framework for explaining democratic participation in the air strikes against the IS. Its results suggest thought-provoking conclusions on the determinants of democratic participation in the air strikes. First, only democracies that had reason to perceive the rise of the IS as a threat to their national interest participated in the operation. Remarkably, the analysis suggests that threat perceptions are linked to the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, indicating that these constituted a vital determinant for participation in the air campaign. Second, states with a strong interest in a good relationship with the United States were generally inclined to participate in the operation. Strikingly however, this was not the case for countries that are dependent on the United States' security guarantees to balance Russian aggression. Given Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine, this suggests that alliance dependence does not incite contributions if the allies' interests are threatened by a common adversary. Lastly, the analysis shows that, in the absence of strong international-level incentives, a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions kept governments from participating. In contrast to inferences of prior research, such institutional constraints mattered irrespective of partisan politics.
While the results of this study apply to all democratic members of the international coalition against the IS, not all conclusions can easily be generalized beyond the scope of Operation Inherent Resolve. Given the unprecedented number of foreign fighters active in Syria, the operation is a most likely case for the link between foreign fighters and military deployment decisions. Since evidentiary support from a most likely case provides only limited inferential leverage, prospective research is necessary to assert whether this inference holds in conflicts with fewer foreign fighters (Levy 2008, 12) . Conversely, since both left-and right-leaning parties had reasons to support the operation, the operation does not constitute a most-likely case for partisan dispute. In consequence, the lack of support for the impact of partisan politics does not clearly contradict the results of studies that did establish a link between ideology and military intervention. However, it does confirm the conclusions of Martini (2014, 15) and Mello (2014, 38) , who, respectively, argued that the impact of ideology is "tied to the context of the intervention" and that "political conflict does not arise equally over all types of military operations." Given the resurgent Russian threat, the air strikes against the IS did constitute a most-likely case for the alliance dependence hypothesis. In consequence, the lack of support for this hypothesis does provide substantial theoretical leverage.
In line with one of the hallmarks of foreign policy analysis scholarship, the study indicates that integrating variables situated at both the domestic and international level is necessary to fully understand foreign policy decision making (Rosenau 1968, 311-312; Hudson 2005, 2-6) . Moreover, this study showed that QCA provides a useful methodological tool to test propositions about foreign policy behavior across political systems, allowing for "modest generalizations" on the impact of variables situated at different levels of analysis (Rosenau 1968, 308; Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 11-12 ). An important downside of a logical method like QCA is that it does not explain the complex processes underlying foreign policy decisions. Prospective research that assesses how alliance politics, threat perceptions, and institutional constraints were "funnelled through the subjective understandings" of domestic decision makers would therefore serve as a valuable complement to this study (Kaarbo 2015, 20) .
